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Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment
As Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court*
By E. G. TimBL**
After the confused period of prohibition enforcement some of
the principles in regard to search and seizure laid down during
that period continued to call for interpretation and application.
In Scher v. United States1 the principle of the Carrollcase was
again involved. The charge in this case was the possession and
transportation of liquor which lacked the revenue stamps required by the Liquor Taxing Act of 1934. Federal officers had
received confidential information which they thought reliable that
about midnight on December 30, 1935 a Dodge automobile with
a specified license number would transport untaxed liquor from a
certain house in Cleveland. On the night of December 30th
Federal officers watched the house. About 9:30 P.M. the car appeared in front of the house; a man with a package and three
women from the house entered the car and drove away; shortly
before midnight the car appeared at the rear of the house, its
lights were put out, and it remained for about half an hour. The
officers heard what seemed to be heavy paper packages passing
over wood; doors slammed and someone drove away in the car
which appeared to be heavily loaded. The officers followed in
another car for several blocks when the car in front turned into a
garage a few feet back of petitioner's house and within the curtilage. One of the officers followed the car into the garage and as
petitioner got out the officer told him he understood the car contained liquor. Petitioner replied he had in the trunk, "just a little
for a party." The officer opened the trunk and found eighty-eight
bottles of untaxed liquor. He arrested petitioner and seized the
liquor and the car. The officers had no warrant of any kind. At
the trial in the lower court counsel for the defense in order to
determine whether there was probable cause undertook to ques*This is the third of four installments of this article. Previous installments
appeared in the January and May, 1958 issues of this Journal.

** Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington. A.B.,
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tion the officers relative to the source of their information which
caused them to observe petitioner's conduct. Objections to these
questions were sustained. Counsel also moved to suppress all the
evidence obtained by the search and to have the seized articles returned on the ground that the search was illegal. It was argued
also that since the car was searched in the garage there was in effect
a search of the garage itself and that the officer was a trespasser.
On these contentions petitioner was overruled and he was convicted. He appealed from the rulings of the lower court.
In a brief unanimous opinion the Supreme Court sustained the
lower court's rulings. The opinion said that public policy forbade
disclosure of an informer's identity "unless essential to the defense" which was not considered to be true here. "The legality of
the officers action" it said, "does not depend upon the credibility
of something told but upon what they saw and heard-what took
place in their presence. ' 2 Considering the doctrine of the Carroll
case, followed in Husty v. United States,3 and "the application of
this to the facts there disclosed," the opinion continued, "it seems
plain enough that just before petitioner entered the garage the
following officers properly could have stopped petitioner's car,
made search and put him under arrest.... Passage of the car into
the open garage closely followed by the observing officer did not
destroy this right. No search was made of the garage. Examination
of the automobile accompanied an arrest, without objection and
4
upon admission of probable guilt."
Deciding this case by applying the rule followed in the Carroll
and Husty cases seems a little strange. It will be recalled that in
the Carrollcase the search of an automobile without a warrant was
permitted on "probable cause." The facts on which probable
cause was established were either presented in evidence in court
or taken judicial notice of by the court. In the Husty case, where
the officers were tipped off by telephone calls, the accused, Husty,
was known to the officers as a notorious bootlegger because of his
past convictions; furthermore, his yard and garage were not invaded.
In the instant case it is clear that "probable cause" would
2Id.

at 254.

'For discussion of Carroll and Husty cases, see second installment in 41 Ky.
L. J. 388 (1953).
' Supra note 2 at 255.
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have to be shown, and that had been defined as facts "sufficient to
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe liquor is
illegally possessed in the automobile to be searched." 5 But how
could the court know that the facts justified such belief without
knowing the source of the officers' information? The original information of the officers might have been pure suspicion or deliberate falsehoods by prejudiced people. Besides, as far as the
record indicates the person who was to transport the liquor was
not named by the informant and hence he was not known by the
officers as a law violator as were Husty and Carroll. The Court
ignored that aspect of the case and said the legality of what the
officers did depended "upon what they saw and heard." What did
they see and hear? They saw a man with a package and three
women come out of the house, get in the car and leave. There
would not seem to be anything very incriminating in that. The
officers did not know any of the people involved. Later they saw
the car at the house again and heard, in the dark presumably,
that it was being loaded with something. It might have been something perfectly legitimate. The fact that it turned out to be liquor
is beside the point. A search is not justified by what is found but
must be justified in advance. 6 Yet the Court said that the officers
could have stopped the car before it turned into the garage and
have made search and put the occupant under arrest. This would
seem to reduce "probable cause" to a meaningless term and to
leave everything to the judgment of the officer. Would a judge

have issued a search warrant on the basis of what the officers saw
and heard?7 Since the car could have been stopped and searched
and the occupant arrested before it entered the garage, according
to the court, the right to search it would presumably not be
destroyed by its having gone into the garage. If the premise be
granted-that is, that search before entering the garage would
have been legal-then the conclusion would be justified. But if
the premise is unsound the conclusion is also, and the officers were
trespassers. And it seems questionable also that the opinion was
sound in saying a search was made of the car but not of the
garage. If the car had not been trailed into the garage but the
officers had come and entered it in order to search the car would
'Husty v. United States 282 U.S. 694, 701 (1980).
'Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
7

Cf. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
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they not be considered as having searched the garage too? Furthermore the Court's statement that "examination of the automobile
accompanied an arrest, without objection and upon admission of
probable guilt," is subject to question. The correct sequence
would seem to be that the car was searched, liquor found, and the
arrest followed; if the search was illegal the arrest would be also.
Nor is it reasonable to assume that the petitioner in submitting
"without objection" to search and in admitting the possession of
liquor which he knew the officer was about to find actually assented to the procedure in such a way as to make an otherwise
illegal proceeding a legal one.8
In such a case as this of course the problem is one of harmonizing private rights and public interest and the Court had repeatedly
said that the Fourth Amendment should be liberally construed to
protect the individual's right. It seems clear this was not done here.
And one of the surprising things about the case is that Justice
McReynolds who wrote a vigorous dissent in the Carroll case wrote
the Court's opinion here.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in 1927 in Olmstead v. United States that tapping a person's telephone wire outside his office to get evidence to be used against him in a criminal
prosecution was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934 specifically prohibiting further wire-tapping. Section 605 of the Act provided that
"no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person."9
The scope and meaning of this section have been involved in
a number of cases which have reached the Supreme Court. Some
of these cases did not raise constitutional issues but rather involved largely questions of statutory interpretation. The decisions
do throw light though on the Court's philosophy regarding the
principle of the Fourth Amendment.
In the first of these cases, Nardone v. United States,10 the Court
had before it a conviction of several defendants, on a charge of
'Compare, Amos v. United States, see first installment 41 Ky. L. J.196, 209
(1953); also Johnson v. United States infra.
'47
U.S. Sec. 605.
1 302 U.S. 879 (1987).
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fraud of the revenue laws by smuggling, possessing, and concealing
of alcohol. Over objections, the lower courts had permitted federal agents to testify as to the interstate telephone messages of the
defendants, constituting a vital part of the proof, obtained by the
agents' tapping defendants' wires. In an opinion written by
Justice Roberts the Court took the view that Section 605 of the
Communications Act prohibited both the interception of the messages and the divulgence of their contents in court. It was argued
that the section should be so interpreted as not to include federal
agents in the term "person," on the theory that Congress could
not have intended to hamper the activities of the government in
the detection and punishment of crime. To this argument the
Court said, "the answer is that the question is one of policy. Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders
should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to
methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.""1 To the contention that statutes applied
to private individuals and not to officials unless the contrary was
clearly intended, which was the basis of a dissent by Justices
Sutherland and McReynolds, the opinion pointed out the limited
scope of that principle and said the correct principle to apply here
was "that the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute
intended to prevent injury and wrong."'1 2 The conviction below
therefore was reversed and the case sent back for a new trial.
Conviction resulted at the second trial and the case came back
to the Supreme Court 3 on the question whether the trial court
had improperly refused to allow the accused to examine the
prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the information
which the Supreme Court excluded in the first case. In the second
case the Circuit Court had ruled that Congress had not "made
incompetent testimony which had become accessible by the use
of unlawful 'taps,' for to divulge that information was not to
divulge an intercepted telephone talk".' 4 In short the question in
the second case was whether Section 605 should be interpreted
narrowly so as to prohibit the introduction into evidence of intercepted telephone conversations themselves, leaving the prosecuRId. at 383.
"Id. at 384.
"308 U.S. 338 (1938).
'Id. at 339.
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tion free to make every other use of the proscribed evidence or
whether the section should be interpreted so as to prevent indirect use of the evidence also.
Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the Court. He began by saying that the exclusion of any logically relevant evidence
in a criminal prosecution "must be justified by an over-riding public policy expressed in the Constitution or the law of the land."
In such a case as this, he said, "two opposing concerns must be
harmonized; on the one hand, the stern enforcement of the
criminal law; on the other, protection of that realm of privacy
left free by constitution and laws but capable of infringement
either through zeal or design."' 5 The result of the holding below,
he said, was "to reduce the scope of Section 605 to exclusion of
the exact words heard through forbidden interceptions, allowing
these interceptions every derivative use that they may serve." Such
a reading of the statute he pointed out "would largely stultify" the
policy laid down in the first case for in that case the Court had
found that Congress had outlawed wiretapping "because inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty."
He went on to say, "to forbid the direct use of methods thus
characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect use would
only invite the very methods condemned." He then quoted approvingly what Justice Holmes had said in the Silverthorne Lumber Company case "that the essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not
be used at all."' 6 The decision of the lower court was therefore
reversed.
In Weiss v. United States'7 a number of individuals were indicted for using the mails to defraud and were convicted largely
by the use of intercepted telephone conversations of an intrastate
nature. The Court-held that in Section 605 the words "any communication" included intrastate as well as interstate messages and
that since Congress "has power, when necessary, for the protection
of interstate commerce, to regulate intrastate transactions, there is
no constitutional requirement that the scope of the statute be
15Id. at 340.
mid. at 341.

'308 U.S. 321 (1939).
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limited so as to exclude intrastate communications."' s Three of
the defendents pleaded guilty and testified for the prosecution
after being confronted with stenographic or phonographic records
of their conversations. The government argued that this constituted authorization by the sender for interception and divulgence of the communications within the meaning of the statute.
The Court rejected this position as untenable and said "the act
contemplates voluntary consent and not enforced agreement to
publication. The participants were ignorant of the interception
of the messages and did not consent thereto."' 9
These cases were followed by Goldstein v. United States"
which raised the question whether records of telephone conversations to which the complainant was not a party and which were
intercepted in violation of the communications act could be used
against him. This was another mail fraud case against a number
of defendants and involved the use by the government of intercepted telephone conversations of Messman and Garrow, two
of the defendants. These defendants on being confronted with
the stenographic record of their telephone conversations confessed
and turned state's evidence. There was a number of assignments
of error in the appeal but the Supreme Court found all of them
without merit except the one regarding the testimony of Messman
and Garrow. The question was stated as follows:
"Assuming the witnesses' testimony was induced by divulging
to them the contents of intercepted telephone messages, was the
admission of this testimony erroneous?" 2' 1 This, it will be noted,
is the same question which arose in the second Nardone case above
except that in that case the senders of the messages did the objecting while here the objector was a third party. The opinion,
written by Justice Roberts, assumed that the interception was unlawful and that the messages were used "to persuade the witnesses
to testify." He pointed out that the Court had previously held that
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment could not be circumvented
by the indirect use against the victim of evidence obtained by
violating the Amendment. The question now was whether this
should be extended to violations of the Communications Act in
'Old. at 327.
'OId.

at 330.
'316
U.S. 114 (1942).
AId. at 117.
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behalf of a party not a party to the intercepted conversations. He
said no court had ever gone so far in interpreting the Amendment
itself and that, although the Supreme Court had never passed on
the question, a number of decisions by lower federal courts had
"denied standing to one not a victim of an unconstitutional search
and seizure to object to the introduction of that which was seized."
"We think," he continued, "no broader sanction should be imposed on the government in respect of violation of the Communications Act."2 2 It had been pointed out by petitioner that Section
605, in addition to prohibiting intercepting and divulging the content of communications without the consent of the sender, provided that
no person having received such intercepted communication
or having become acquainted with the contents ...

know-

ing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or
publish the existence, contents, etc.... thereof, or use the

same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entiled thereto.
Petitioner argued therefore that the federal officers violated the
Act by making "use" of the evidence and that petitioner had
standing to object to such use. The government maintained that
this "use for benefit" argument did not apply to federal officers in
securing evidence but was intended to prevent use for personal
advantage of the user. But the Court felt it did not need to pass
on the government's contention. Justice Roberts merely said:
We are of the opinion, that even though the use made of
the communications by the prosecuting officers to induce
the parties to them to testify were held a violation of the
statute, this would not render the testimony so procured inadmissible against a person not 2a3 party to the message. This
is the settled common law rule.

The opinion closed by pointing out that "there was no use at the
trial of the intercepted communications themselves, or of any information they contained as such" and said that, "if such use as
occurred here (their use to induce other evidence) is a violation
of the Act, the statute itself imposes a sanction."
Justice Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion for himself, the
2Id.

at 121.

"Id. at 122.
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Chief Justice and Justice Frankfurter.

(Justice Jackson took no

part in the case). In his dissent Justice Murphy took the position
that the Court's decision in the second Nardone case should control in this case. He said that in that case "We held the policy of
Section 605 required the exclusion not merely of the intercepted
messages but also of the other evidence acquired through their
unlawful use. Otherwise the broad purpose of the statute to outlaw practices inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of
personal liberty would have been largely defeated. ' 24 He then
took the position that the fact that the petitioner was not a party
to the intercepted messages called for no different legal result.
"While the sender can" he said, "render interception, divulgence,
or use lawful by his consent, it is a complete non sequitur to conclude that he alone has standing to object to the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of Section 605."25 He went on to
say "it is immaterial, for the object to be served by that section,
whether objection is made by the one sending the communication
or by another who is prejudiced by its use." The rule that evidence so obtained was inadmissible was not a remedy for the
sender but "it is the obedient answer to the Congressional command that society shall not be plagued with such practices as wiretapping." 2 He then referred to Justice Holmes' statement in the
Silverthorne Lumber case to the effect that; the essence of the rule
of the Fourth Amendment was that such illegal evidence could not
be used at all, and said the decisions of lower federal courts that
only the victim of a search and seizure contravening the Fourth
Amendment could object to the use of the evidence did not furnish a proper analogy, because the statute forbade "all interception, divulgence, or use by any person without the consent of the
sender." The statement by the majority that the evidence was not
inadmissible because the act provided a penalty for violation of
Section 605 was, he said "a direct repudiation of both the Nardone
cases and the Weiss case." He concluded by saying that "When
Congress condemned the 'use' of lawlessly intercepted communications, the last thing it intended to sanction was the use of such interceptions in a court of justice." 27
2

' Id. at 126.

2

Id. at 126.

" Id. at 127.
2 Id. at 128.
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The difference between-the majority and the minority views
was a difference of statutory interpretation that involved the constitutional philosophy of the members of the court. What the
statute said was clear enough, and the Court had held in the
second Nardone case that the use of illegally intercepted evidence
to obtain other evidence was a violation of the Communications
Act when the accused party who was making the complaint was a
party to the messages. This was done on the theory that Congress
intended to outlaw "unethical practices." If Congress so intended
why should such practices be permitted by the Court merely because the complaining party was not a party to the messages,
especially since Congress did not indicate that it intended any such
exception.
The majority opinion seized upon an old common law rule
which greatly narrowed a public policy laid down by Congress.
Congress would certainly seem to have the constitutional authority
to change a common law rule as far as the federal courts are concerned. This ruling is in sharp contrast with what the Court did
in the Weeks case.28 In that case, it will be recalled, the Court
deliberately departed from the common law rule that a court
would not look into the methods by which evidence was obtained
and read into the Fourth Amendment the principle that evidence
obtained by an illegal search and seizure could not be used. In the
instant case it moved in the opposite direction and used the common law rule to limit and partially defeat a congressional policy
designed to prevent practices "inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty" and, in effect, to enlarge the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.
A slightly different but related question came before the Court
at the same session, as the above case. In Goldman v. United
States29 petitioners Martin, Goldman and Shulman were tried and
convicted for a conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act. Two
federal agents with the assistance of the building superintendent
obtained access at night to Shulman's office and attempted to install a hearing apparatus in the wall of the office with a wire
extending into an adjoining room where the agents expected to
hear and record Shulman's conversation with Goldman and one
'For discussion, see First Installment 41 Ky. L. J. 196 at 205 (1953).
316 United States 129 (1942).
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Hoffman, the latter acting in collusion with the agents. The hearing apparatus did not work the next day, however, and the agents
attached to the wall of the room a detectaphone and overheard
and made a record of the conversations in Shulman's office and
also of a telephone conversation which Shulman engaged in. Before trial the petitioners on learning of what had happened moved
to have the evidence suppressed on the ground that knowledge
of the telephone conversation had been obtained in violation of
Section 605 of the Communications Act and that knowledge of
the office conversation among the three men had been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The lower court admitted
the evidence and the Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Roberts affirmed. The opinion after disposing of a preliminary
question, took up the matter of listening to the telephone conversation which it said did not violate the Act. Justice Roberts
said that there was neither a communication or an interception
within the meaning of the statute. He then made this rather surprising statement, "The protection intended and afforded by the
statute is of the means of communication and not of the secrecy
of the conversation." 30 It would seem clear that it was the secrecy
of the conversation which was to be protected. This seems also to
be understood by Justice Roberts for after quoting Section 3 of
the Act he said, "What is protected is the message itself throughout the course of its transmission." Written words to be sent by
telegraph did not become a communication under the statute until
they were given to an agent of the telegraph company, he said,
and "words spoken in a room in the presence of another into a
telephone receiver do not constitute a communication by wire
within the meaning of the section." 3' It is difficult to see why
talking into a telephone receiver is not a communication. If it is
not at the time, when does it become such? Is it after the human
voice has left the office of the speaker? Unlike the words of a
telegram before delivery to the telegraph company, nothing more
is to be done to make the words spoken into a telephone a communication. The receiver is part of the transmission apparatus
and receipt at the other end of the line is instantaneous. In this
case reception at the other end of the wire no doubt occurred be,Old. at 183.
f Id. at 133.

KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL

fore the sound penetrated the wall and was picked up by the government agents. But Justice Roberts said that interception "indicates the taking or seizure by the way or before arrival at the
destination," and that it did "not ordinarily connote the obtaining
of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed sender or after, or at the moment it comes
into the possession of the intender receiver." 3- It is submitted that
this statement implies the passage of more time between the speaking of the words and their reception at the other end than is true
in fact or than is legally sound.
The opinion then considered whether the trespass in the office
of Shulman made the use of the detectaphone illegal. It said that
it did not because the trespass was made in connection with the
installation of the hearing apparatus which failed to function and
"the relation between the trespass and the use of the detectaphone
was that of antecedent and consequent." It accepted the finding
of the lower courts that "the trespass did not aid materially in the
use of the detectaphone.133 The most important question was
whether the use of the detectaphone violated the Fourth Amendment. It was argued by the defense that the case could be distinguished from the Olmstead case because in the latter the Court
had said that in using the telephone the speaker projected his
voice beyond his office and assumed the risk that it would be overheard, while in the present case the speaker did not intend for
his voice to go beyond his office. This distinction the Court said
was "too nice for practical application of the constitutional guarantee," 34 and that "no reasonable or logical distinction" could be
drawn between the cases. It refused also petitioners alternative
request that it overrule the Olmstead case.
Justice Murphy wrote a short dissent in which he admitted
that if the Amendment "were given only a literal construction, it
might not fit the case" before the court, but he endorsed the view
that Justice Holmes took in his dissent in the Olnstead case. It is
believed a few of his statements merit quoting because of the importance of the conflict between the literal interpretation of the
'I

Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.

Id. at 135. In Olmstead v. United States the court held that tapping a telephone wire did not constitute a physical search of an office and hence did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See second installment 1 Ky. L. J., p. 407 (1953).
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Fourth Amendment adopted by the majority in the Olmstead case
and here, and the interpretation based on principle taken by
Justice Brandeis in the former case and Justice Murphy in this'
case. Justice Murphy said:
The conditions of modem life have greatly expanded the
range and character of those activities which require protection from intrusive action by government officials if men
and women are to enjoy the full benefit of that privacy
which the Fourth Amendment was intended to provide. It
is our duty to see that this historic provision receives a construction sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the
needs and manners of each succeeding generation. 35
He then noted that physical entry may be wholly immaterial, for
the search of one's home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has brought forth far more effective
devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct
and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by
our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment.
... Whether the search of private quarters is accomplished
by placing on the outer walls of the sanctum a detectaphone
•.. or by new methods of photography that penetrated the
walls or overcome distances the privacy of the citizen is
equally invaded.3 6
He then pointed out the results of the literal interpretation which
required a physical entry and search before the Amendment was
violated, and said,
It is strange doctrine that keeps inviolate the most mundane
observations entrusted to the permanence of paper but allows the revelation of thoughts uttered within the sanctity
of private quarters, thoughts perhaps too intimate to be set
down even in a secret diary, or indeed, utterances about
which the common law drew the cloak of privilege-the
most confidential revelations between husband and wife,
client and lawyer, patient and physician, a penitent and
37
spiritual adviser.
This difference in interpreting the Amendment is of course fundamental. If the principle be accepted that the privacy of the individual should be respected it would not seem to be very im-

at 188.
N
Id.
at 139.
"Id. at
141.
36Id.
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portant how the invasion of that privacy is accomplished. Justice
Bradley had said in the Boyd case3 8 that the breaking of the doors
and rummaging of drawers did not constitute the essence of the
offense, and warned that a close and literal construction deprived
30
the Amendment of half its efficacy.
In Davis v. United States"° the Court had before it a case involving the enforcement of price control during World War II.
Davis was convicted for the misdemeanor of illegally having in his
possession gasoline ration coupons. He claimed that the evidence
used against him was obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
Davis was president of an Auto Laundry Corp. which was suspected of running a black market in gasoline. Federal agents went
without warrants of any kind to a place near his service station
and watched it for several hours. Two of the agents finally drove
their cars into the station and purchased gasoline without coupons
from an attendant by paying above ceiling prices. The station
attendant said she was selling under Davis' instructions. The
agents arrested her for selling above ceiling prices and without
securing coupons. While they were making the arrest Davis drove
into the station and was also arrested on the same charges. The
agents demanded and received from him the keys to tin boxes attached to the gasoline pumps in which ration coupons were kept.
The coupons found were not sufficient to cover the amount by
which the capacity of the storage tanks had been diminished by
sales. Two of the agents went with Davis into the waiting room
which was adjoined by an inner office the door to which was
locked. The agents demanded that Davis open the door. This he
refused to do although he maintained that he had coupons in that
room to make up the discrepancy between the amount of coupons
found outside and the amount of gasoline on hand. One agent
testified that he did not try to convince Davis that he ought to
open the door but told him "he would have to open that door."
Another agent went outside and with a light looked through the
window and tried to open it. When Davis saw the agent trying to
open the window he said "He don't need to do that I will open
the damn door." He testified that he did so because the agents
first installment 41 Ky. L. J.186 at 200 (1953).
'Justice Jackson did not participate in the case and Chief Justice Stone and
Justice Frankfurter stated that they would have joined in overruling the Olmstead
case which they thought was indistinguishable.
'4 328 U.S. 582 (1948).
',
See
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threatened to break down the door. The illegally possessed coupons were found in a filing cabinet in the inner room. The District Court found that Davis had voluntarily consented to the
search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb
that finding but expressed some doubt about it. It upheld the conviction on the theory that the search and seizure was incidental to
a lawful arrest and hence was reasonable. The law made it a misdemeanor to sell gasoline at above ceiling prices or to sell it without coupons. It was for these offenses that Davis was arrested and
his place searched but he was not prosecuted for these offenses.
It was some six weeks later that he was arrested, tried, and convicted for the offenses of illegally having in his possession the
coupons found in the inner office. The Supreme Court, could
then, conceivably uphold conviction on either of two grounds,
that the search and seizure was justified as inciedntal to a lawful
arrest, or that Davis had voluntarily consented to the search. It
chose the latter ground together with the nature of the documents
to uphold conviction. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the
Court.
Justice Douglas took the view that the papers seized were government property; hence the rule applicable to the seizure of private papers did not apply. He said, citing statutory authority, that
the "ration coupons never became the private property of the
holder but remained at all times the property of the government
and subject to inspection and recall by it."41 He then quoted as
authority from the opinion in Wilson v. United States to the effect
that
In the case of public records and official documents, made
or kept in the administration of public office, the fact of
actual possession or lawful custody would not justify the
officer in resisting inspection, even though the record was
made by himself and would supply the evidence of his
criminal dereliction.... The principle applies not only to
public documents in public offices, but also to records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established. There the privilege, which
exists as to private papers, cannot be maintained. The
"Id. at 588.

212
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fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases, is that
where... the books and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, the custodian has no
privilege to refuse production although their contents tend
to criminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted
the incident obligation to permit inspection.42
"The distinction" Justice Douglas said, "is between property to
which the government is entitled to possession and property to
which it is not."
He disavowed any intention of saying that the government
could "proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints" or "that the
right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general
search of his papers." "The nature of the coupons," he said, "is
important here merely as indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining them. '43
And at another place he said "where the officers seek to inspect
public documents at the place of business where they are required
to be kept, permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as
where private papers are sought. The demand in one of right."
He repeated a number of times that the search occurred "at the
place of business," not at petitioner's home. He closed his opinion
by pointing out that the District Court found that the agents
talked Davis into permitting the inspection of the coupons and
stated "We cannot say as a matter of law that that finding was
44
erroneous.1
Justice Frankfurter, with Justice Murphy, dissented in an
opinion which differed fundamentally with the Court's opinion,
and therefore merits consideration. He pointed out that Congress
had not attempted to authorize the seizure by warrant of such
documents for a misdeamenor and that Gouled v. United States"5
made it illegal to seize them under judicial authority. He said the
Court's holding that they could be seized without a warrant because the gasoline business was regulated amounted to holding
that "a search which could not be justified under a search warrant is lawful without it." Surely, he thought, the Constitution
did not mean "to make it legally advantageous not to have a warId.
Id.
" Id.
"See
13

at 590.
at 591.
at 593.
first installment 41 Ky. L. J. 196 at 207 (1953).
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rant, so that the police may roam freely. ' 46 He admitted that
there was a difference between private papers and those in which
the public had an interest. Private papers could not be seized
under legal process while public papers could be seized but "only
upon a properly safeguarded search." "Had the coupons in controversy been secured by a proper search they could be used against
the defendant at the trial," he said, but "their character does not
eliminate the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment... -147 The
Court's opinion he continued had "only its own reasoning to support it" and pointed out that Wilson v. United States, relied on by
the Court, "concerned the difference between the amenability of a
corporation to testimonial compulsion and the immunity of an
individual ... to be free from the duty to give testimony. "48
He then reviewed the historical meaning of the Fourth Amendment and concluded that in the mind of the framers of the Constitution "all seizures without judicial authority were deemed
'unreasonable'." In support of this he quoted from a decision of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts interpreting the provision of
that state's constitution on which the Fourth Amendment was
based. The Massachusetts court said "This article does not prohibit all search and seizures of a man's person, his papers and
possessions...; but such only as are unreasonable and the foundation of which is not previously supported by oath or affirmation."49 In the instant case Justice Frankfurter said "no attempt
was made to get a search warrant because none could have been
got." He then reviewed the former decisions of the Court and
said that "with a deviation promptly retraced" they had "reflected
the broad purpose of the Fourth Amendment." The lower court
had relied chiefly on Marron v. United States but "the sting of the
Marron case was taken by two later cases," he said, citing the GoBart and Lefkowitz cases. Having reached the conclusion that the
search and seizure could not have been authorized by a court he
considered whether they could be justified without a warrant
under some of the exceptions to the common law. One of these
exceptions was the right to seize without warrant goods on moving
vehicles; another was the right to search the person upon arrest.
,"328 U.S. 582 at 595.

Id. at 602.
'Id.
at 603.
9
'7

Commonwealth v. Dana 2 Met. (Mass.) 329; quoted Id. at 605.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

This latter right he thought the Court had kept within narrow
limits except in the Marron case which he repeated had been displaced by the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases. He insisted that it was
important to keep clear the distinction between a prohibited
search and an illegal seizure. One of these could be legal and the
other illegal under certain circumstances. 0
He gave attention also to the District Court's finding which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court, that Davis had voluntarily
consented to the search. He said "one must reject the District
Court's finding that Davis' consent went with his surrender of the
documents unless one is to hold that every submission to the imminent exertion of superior force is consensual if force is not physically applied," 51 and cited Amos v. United States where the Court
held there was "implied coercion" under similar circumstances.
He commented on the Court's finding voluntariness because it was
ration coupons that were demanded by saying that "to make
voluntariness turn on the nature of the quest, instead of on the
nature of the response of the person in control of the documents,
is to distort familiar notions on the basis of which the law has
'5 2
heretofore adjudged legal consequences.

He closed by pointing out that Davis was arrested first for the
selling of gasoline above ceiling prices and for not securing
coupons. For neither of these offenses were "coupons instruments
of the crime" in any proper sense, and the right to search on arrest, he said, extended only to the articles necessary to the commission of the crime for which arrest was made. He then pointed
out that the offense of possessing illegal coupons for which Davis
was later arrested and tried was a misdemeanor for which arrest
without a warrant could be made only if the offense was committed
in the presence of the officers; but said that prior to the search, the
"officers had no basis for stating that he was committing the crime
of illegal possession of the coupons in their presence." 53 Justice
Rutledge wrote a brief dissent also, and Justice Jackson did not
participate in the decision.
'oCases cited were: Gouled v. United States 255 U.S. 298; Amos v. United
States 255 U.S. 313; Byars v. United States 273 U.S. 28; Taylor v. United States
286 U.S. 1.
51328 U.S. 582 at 599. See first installment, 41 Ky. L. J.209 (1953) for discussion of Amos v. United States.
Id. at 600.

Id. at 614.
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It seems celar that judged by previous decisions the majority
opinion had very feeble support. Whether the decision was sound
in spite of that fact is a question on which honest and patriotic
people may differ as is shown of course by the Court's division. It
could be argued that since gasoline was rationed, the coupons being government property, and since the government reserved the
right to inspect them, there was no unreasonable search and
seizure. Such a position though runs counter to the basic principle
of the Fourth Amendment, namely, that a judicial officer, not a
policeman, should decide when and to what extent a search should
be resorted to. It seems clear also that the opinion of the Court
confused two different principles-that Davis voluntarily agreed to
the search and seizure; and that the officers could search as a matter of right because the coupons were government documents. If
Davis voluntarily permitted the search it would seem to make no
difference about the nature of the documents; presumably one can
always permit his house or office to be searched. If, on the other
hand, the search was lawful as a matter of right because of the
character of the documents then persuasion was unnecessary. Yet
the Court said that because of the nature of the documents the
permissible limits of persuasion had not been crossed. It would
seem clear that the officers either could search and seize as a matter
of right or that they could not do so. Furthermore it is difficult to
see any voluntary consent here especially when one of the agents
testified that he did not try to convince Davis to open the door
but told him he had to do so.
The majority opinion relied on the decision in the Wilson
case, and the opinion in that case does indicate a different attitude
toward documents in which the public has an interest and purely
private papers. However, it will be recalled 4 that in that case a
subpoena duces tecum had been issued by a court to a corporation
and served on Wilson its president to produce the company's
books before the grand jury. Wilson pleaded self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourth, and it was this issue
that brought fourth the statement used by Justice Douglas in the
Court's opinion. In that case judicial process was used; while in
the instant case, as Justice Frankfurter repeatedly pointed out, it
was police action without judicial authority which the government
"See first installment 41 Ky. L. J. 198 at 213 (1953).
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was attempting to justify. Seizing documents with judicial process
and without such process Justice Frankfurter correctly said "is the
difference between the protection of civil liberties and their invasion." 5 5 The confusion in the opinion and its lack of support
by previous decisions together with the fact that the opinion did
not carry the authority of a majority of the whole Court leave it a
very unsatisfactory decision for the future.
On the same day that the above case was decided the Court
decided Zap v. United States,5 in which the petitioner had signed
a contract to do some work for the Navy. By the contract the
Navy was authorized to examine his books. This was being done
by the use of FBI agents. The agents found an incriminating cancelled check which they requested and obtained from petitioner's
bookkeeper. The use of this check in a criminal prosecution of
petitioner for defrauding the government was challenged by him.
Justice Douglas again wrote the opinion for the majority holding that the use of the check did not violate the accused's rights.
Since the petitioner had agreed to have his books inspected and
since the inspection was properly done, the search was lawful, and
the agents could testify as to any facts obtained by the search. The
question was then, he said, "whether the check itself could be
introduced at the trial." 57 He then stated that if "it be assumed
in passing that the taking of the check was unlawful, that would
not make inadmissible in evidence the knowledge which had been
legally obtained" and "had the check been returned to petitioners
on the motion to suppress, a warrant for it could have been immediately issued." To forbid the use of the check itself he concluded "would be to exalt a technicality to constitutional levels."58
Justice Frankfurter again dissented and was joined by Justices
Murphy and Rutledge. He agreed that the government could
legally make the search and the inspectors could testify to what
they found but he insisted that the "legality of a search does not
automatically legalize every accompanying seizure," and cited the
Marron case where the Court held that police could not seize
under a search warrant things not covered in the warrant. He
closed by saying, "The fact that this evidence might have been
328 U.S. 582 at 602.
'

328 U.S. 624 (1946).
Id. at 625.

r Id. at 630.
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seized by a lawful warrant seems a strange basis for approving
seizure without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment stands in the
way. "
'

In Harrisv. United States0 the Court had before it a clearer
case of search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. Five FBI
agents with two warrants of arrest for Harris charging the use of
the mails to defraud and their use to send stolen property entered
his apartment and arrested him in the living room. They then
proceeded to search his entire four room apartment in a very
thorough manner, primarily for two cancelled checks but according to the agents' testimony for "any means that might have been
used to commit these two crimes." No real evidence of the crimes
charged in the warrants was found but a number of miscellaneous
items such as stationery, pens, hotel bills, etc. were taken. The
agents did, however, find in a bureau drawer in the bedroom an
envelope marked "George Harris, personal papers" containing
eight notices of classification cards and eleven registration certificates with the stamp of a Local Draft Board. He was indicted,
tried and convicted with this evidence for unlawful possession,
concealment, etc. of these latter documents. He objected to the
use of the evidence as having been seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Chief Justice Vinson wrote a comparatively short opinion for
the majority upholding the conviction. He began by pointing out
that search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest was well
established in American law, and that the opinions of the Court
had frequently recognized that the search could extend "beyond
the person arrested to include the premises under his immediate
control." In support of this he quoted a dictum from the Agnello
case as follows:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to
search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime
and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means by which it was committed, as well as
weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody,
is not to be doubted.06
RId. at 633.
3'331
U.S. 145 (1946).
Id.at 151; for Agnello case, see second installment 41 Ky. L. J. 388 at 397

(1953).
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No support he said could be found for the position that the
search could not extend beyond the room in which the arrest was
made, 61a citing the Agnello and Marron cases as cases which went
beyond the room. He pointed out that "Petitioner was in exclusive possession of a four-room apartment," and "his control extended quite as much to the bed room in which the draft cards
62
were found as to the living room in which the arrest was made."
The Court he said had "frequently recognized the distinction between merely evidentiary materials ... which may not be seized
. . and those objects which may validly be seized" such as in*

struments of the crime. "The checks and other instrumentalities
of the crime charged in the warrants toward which the search was
directed as well as the draft cards which were in fact seized fall
within that class of objects properly subject to seizure," he concluded.63 He went on to say that "in keeping the draft cards in
his custody petitioner was guilty of a serious and continuing offense . . . in the very presence of the agents conducting the

search. 0' 4 It was therefore a reasonable and legal search and seizure and conviction.
Justice Frankfurter again dissented in an opinion concurred in
by Justices Murphy and Rutledge. He repeated much of his dissenting opinion in the Davis case above pointing out again that
under the Fourth Amendment "with minor and severely confined
exceptions, inferentially a part of the Amendment, every search
and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magistrate's
authority expressed through a validly issued warrant."O5 Exceptions were made when the search was of a moving vehicle or was
the exercise of the right to search for and seize on arrest "all that
is on the person, or is in such open and immediate physical relation to him as to be in a fair sense a projection of his person."0 6
He challenged the view of the majority that because a man's house
and its contents are in his "possession" and "control" for some
legal purposes they are also for the purpose of search. "Due regard," he said, "for the policy of the Amendment precludes indulgence in the fiction that the recesses of a man's house are like
" But see, People v. Conway Infra, note 88 and Smith v. Jerome there cited.
"Supra note 60 at 152.
'lId. at 154.
" id.at 155.
6Id. at 162.
'lId. at 168.
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the pockets of the clothes he wears at the time of arrest."67 Even
if the search was considered reasonable because the apartment was
in the accused's control he said it did not follow that the seizure
was. He pointed out, citing the Marron case, that "if the agents
had obtained a warrant to look for the cancelled checks they
would not be entitled to seize other items discovered in the
process." "The Court's decision," he said, "achieves the novel and
startling result of making the scope of search without a warrant
broader than an authorized search." 68 He dosed by quoting
Justice Leonard Hand as follows: "After arresting a man, in his
house, to rummage at will among his papers in search of whatever
will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what
might be done under a general warrant." 9
Justice Murphy also wrote a separate dissent in which he insisted that the Court's opinion "converts a warrant for arrest
into a general search warrant lacking all the constitutional safeguards,"7 0 and pointed out as did Justice Frankfurter that the
agents made no effort to get a warrant to search the apartment
although they did get warrants to search petitioner's office and
automobile. "Certainly the constitution is not dependent upon
the whim or convenience of law enforcement officers," 71 he concluded.
Justice Jackson also wrote a short dissent in which he agreed
with Justices Frankfurter and Murphy that "no search of premises,
as such is reasonable except the cause for it be approved and the
limits of it fixed and the scope of it particularly defined by a disinterested magistrate."72 He pointed out the serious implications
of the Court's opinion saying that it apparently would permit
such a search even though the arrest be for a petty misdemeanor,
permit an officer to choose a man's residence as the place to make
an arrest thus getting the right to search the house, and would
leave it to the arresting officer rather than a magistrate to determine the extent of the search to be made. If a search "is allowed
to go beyond the person arrested and the objects upon him or in
Id. at 164.
8Id. at 165.
' Id. at 174; quotation from Judge Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt 16
F. 2d 202, 203.
"
Id. at 183.
7
Id. at 190.
7
Id. at 198.
67
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his immediate physical control," he said, "I see no practical limit
short of that set in the opinion of the court-and that means to
'73
me no limit at all."
It will be noted that the chief support for the Court's decision
was the dictum from the Agnello case to the effect that the right
of search incident to a lawful arrest extends to the "place" where
the arrest is made. It is appropriate therefore to examine the
statement and the authorities cited for it.
In the first place it should be noted that the statement spoke
of the right to search after the arrest of one "while committing a
crime" which was the situation in the Agnello case. Harris, however, was not arrested while committing a crime but on charges of
a previously committed crime. In the second place the term
"place" in the Agnello dictum was not defined and, as will be recalled, the decision in the case actually held that the place involved
(the house of Agnello) had been illegally searched because it was
several blocks away from the scene of the arrest.
As authority for this dictum the Court in the Agnello case cited
passages in the Weeks and Carroll cases. The passage from the
Carroll opinion spoke merely of the right in connection with the
lawful arrest of a person to seize "whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have" 74 and
which might be used as evidence. This statement was supported
by citing the Weeks case, Bishop's work on criminal procedure,
and the cases of Dillon v. O'Brien,7 5 Kneeland v. Connelly76 and
Getchel v. Page.77 The passage in the Weeks" case referred to
dealt merely with the search of the "person" of one arrested. The
passage 79 in Bishop's work referred to is substantially that of the
Agnello dictum but is itself based upon the above-mentioned
cases except the Weeks case.
In the Dillon case above officers O'Brien and Davis had a warrant for the arrest of Dillon and others on a charge of conspiracy
to defraud some tenants. The officers went to Dillon's house,
78

Id. at 197.
711267 U.S. 138 at 158.
'16 Cox C. C.245 (1887).
7*70 Ga. 424 (1888).

' 69 A. 624 (1908).
"Weeks v. U.S. 232 U.S. 388 at 392 (1914).
"New Criminal Procedure by Joel P. Bishop, second edition by H. C. Underbill Vol. 1, Sec. 211, p. 153, Chicago, 1913. Several other cases are cited dealing
with different aspects of the problem.
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entered through the open door and found Dillon and his fellow
conspirators "in furtherance of, and as part of that conspiracy,
engaged in receiving rents from certain tenants, and had books
and papers in which they were making entries of the receipt of
rents, and also a certain telegram, all of which were being used for
the purpose of such combination and conspiracy."' 0 The officers
arrested the conspirators and seized some banknotes, the books
and papers and other property being used at the time. The Judge
after reviewing earlier cases and distinguishing Entwich v. Carrington, said that officers on the lawful arrest of one "are entitled .. .to take and detain property found in his possession

which will form material evidence in his prosecution for that
crime.""' In Kneeland v. Connelly 2 a chief of police having a
warrant for the arrest of a gambler entered his place of business and in addition to arresting him seized some tables and
roulette wheels used in running the gambling house. Without a
discussion of the constitutional aspects of the case the court said
the warrant "carries with it the power or legal authority to seize
the implements of his crime."8 3
Getchell v. Page8 4 was a Maine case involving a civil action
against an officer for trespass for the seizure of some materials
used to make liquor under a warrant to search for intoxicating
liquor. The liquor was found and seized, the owner was arrested,
and other material not covered by the warrant but useful as evidence was also seized. The court upheld the officer's right to seize
"the instruments of the crime" and "such other articles as may
reasonably be of use as evidence upon the trial."8 5 There was
therefore a lawful search under a warrant during which the evidence was found and a lawful arrest made.
In addition to the above cases a number of others have arisen
in the states. In Michigan it was held that an officer on arresting a
man in his room for homicide by shooting could legally seize a
86
revolver found in a drawer of a sewing machine in the room;
also the same court held that when an officer legally entered a
s 16 Cox C. C. 245 (1887).

Id. 249.

'70 Ga.424 (1883).
Id.429.
"69
A 624 (1908).
TM
Id. 626.
, People v. Cona 147 N.W. 526 (1914).
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house to quell a disturbance and lawfully arrested a drunk man
sitting at a table he could "take possession of things in plain sight
which are in themselves evidence of the ... crime for which
the arrest is made."8 7 In this case the thing seized was a bottle of
...

whiskey on the table at which the drunk man sat. But the same
court held the following year that the right to search was limited
to the room in which the arrest was made.8 8 Here the arrest was
made under a warrant charging violation of the state liquor law.
The sheriff arrested Mrs. Conway in her home and he and his
deputies searched the house, finding a bottle of "white mule"
under the floor at the head of the stairs. The court held that the
warrant gave the sheriff
lawful access only to that part of the house which it was
necessary for him to enter in order to serve his warrant.
Here, where he was lawfully present he could search for
evidence...; but further he could not go without invading
the constitutional rights of defendant. He and his deputies
did not gain lawful access to that part of the house where
the white mule was kept.
The court quoted approvingly the New York case of Smith v.
Jerome 9 in which the New York court in upholding the search of
defendant's room after his arrest and the seizure of two incriminating letters, said,
The police have the power and it is also their duty to
search the person of one lawfully arrested, and also the room
or place in which he is arrested, and also any other place
to which they can get lawful access, for articles that may be
used in evidence to prove the charge on which he is arrested.90
In addition to the above cases the question had arisen in a
number of cases in the lower federal courts. These courts, as Chief
Justice Vinson pointed out, seem to have assumed that search
need not be restricted to the room in which the arrest was made.
The decisions which he cited 90 were, however, decided after the
Agnello and Marron decisions and followed them.
People v. Woodward (1922)
'People v. Conway 195 N.W.
N. Y. Supp. 202.
People v. Conway 195 N.W.
" U. S. v. Lindenfeld 142 F.

190 N.W. 721.
679 (1923).
679 (1923).
2d 829 (1944); Matthews v. Correa 135 Fed.

2d 534 (1943); U. S. v. 71, 41 Ounces of Gold 94 F. 2d 17 (1938).
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The cases reviewed above are the most important ones dealing
with the right to search the "place" where a lawful arrest is made
and incident thereto, prior to the Marron case-the second one relied upon by the court.
In the Marron case, it will be recalled, the Court permitted
the entire suite of four rooms to be searched. This case, however,
would seem to have been greatly narrowed if not silently overruled in the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases, as was pointed out by
the dissenting Justices in the Harris case. Each of these cases
ruled out the search of a small office as incident to lawful arrests.
Justice Butler who wrote the opinions in them as he did in the
Marron case emphasized that in the latter case the things seized,
the bills and ledger, were being used in the operation of the
illegal enterprise, that they were "visible, and accessible, and in
the offender's immediate custody." 91
It will be noted that in the cases reviewed above which occurred prior to the Agnello and Marron cases the "place" the
search of which was permitted incident to a lawful arrest only,
was in every case the room in which the arrest was made and one
of them specifically held, contrary to Chief Justice Vinson's statement, that the search could not extend beyond the room. Also in
nearly all of the cases the things seized were in plain view and in
the immediate control of the one arrested and no detailed search
was necessary. 92 Furthermore, in Dillon v. O'Brien, most relied on
as authority, as well as in Kneeland v. Connelly and in People v.
Woodward, the things seized were being used illegally at the time
of the seizure. It will be remembered that the dictum in the
Agnello case referred to the arrest of one "while committing a
crime" and in the Marroncase the Court emphasized the fact that
the accused was caught in the act of running the illegal enterprise;
in the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases the opinions emphasized that
the accused were "not committing a crime when arrested" implying, it would seem, that if they had been that fact would have
been significant. It is submitted that this view might well be
' Go-Bart v. United States 282 U.S. 344, 358. For discussion of these cases
see 41 Ky. L. J. 401-3 (1953).
Exceptions were: People v. Cona where a revolver was found in the drawer
of a sewing machine but the officer making the arrest had seen the accused shoot

the victim with a revolver; Smith v. Jerome where the officer searched the accused's room and effects and found the evidence in the coat pockets of the accused.
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adopted by the courts as the criterion for the legality of a search
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. If one is found in the act
of committing the crime, the propriety of seizing the instruments
with which he is committing the offense or the fruits of the offense
which are in his active, visible, physical possession could hardly be
questioned. This could no doubt be done without the necessity
for much search. The only alternative, if any search beyond the
person of the one arrested, is to be permitted at all, would seem
to be to limit the search to the room in which the arrest is made
-a not very satisfactory rule.
From the foregoing discussion it would seem that court decisions prior to the Harriscase furnished very little if any support
for the proposition that officers could in making a lawful arrest
for a crime committed sometime previously search an entire apartment or house for evidence of the crime, much less seize evidence
of some other crime and use it to prosecute the suspect. The
seriousness of the principle laid down in the majority opinion was
pointed out by each of the dissenting opinions. It practically
nullifies the Fourth Amendment. As Justice Jackson said it permits officers with a warrant to arrest for even a minor offense to
choose to make the arrest in the home and thus acquire the right
to search the house. That is, indeed, "indistinguishable from
what might be done under a general warrant" 93 and even a general
warrant would have to be issued by a magistrate.
In United States v. Di Re 94 an informer by the name of Reed

had reported to an agent of the Office of Price Administration that
he was to buy counterfeit gasoline coupons from one Buttitta at a
certain place in the city of Buffalo. The agent and a policeman
trailed Buttitta's car to the named placed where the car was
parked. When the officers approached the car the informer was
alone in the back seat and had counterfeit coupons which he said
he bought from Buttitta, the driver of the car. Without previous
information implicating Di Re who was in the front seat with
Buttitta and without a warrant the officers arrested and searched
him and the driver and found counterfeit coupons on Di Re. With
this evidence Di Re was convicted of illegal possession of the
coupons. The government defended the search on alternative
Judge Learned Hand quoted above, note 65.

332 U.S. 581 (1948).

SrEAxH AND SmzurE

grounds. First, that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest; second, that the search of his person was justified as incident to the search of the automobile reasonably believed to be
carrying contraband. Justice Jackson wrote the opinion holding
the search of Di Re unlawful and Justice Black and Chief Justice
Vinson dissented without writing an opinion.
In defending the search of Di Re as incident to the search of
the automobile the government relied upon the ruling in the
Carrollcase. Justice Jackson pointed out that in that case a Congressional statute authorized the search of an automobile without
a warrant on probable cause, and that the Court had never held
without such statutes that a car could be thus searched. It was not
necessary in this case to pass on that question he said because
"there appears to have been no search of the car itself." 95 Assuming though, without deciding, that there was probably cause for
searching it he considered the government's argument that such
a power should exist as a matter of common sense. He said the
government admitted that it would not contend that a warrant to
search a residence would authorize the search of people in it, and
he thought it would follow that a warrant to search a car would
confer no greater authority. If that be so, he reasoned, it could
not be maintained that the right to search a car without a warrant
conferred greater authority than to search one with a warrant.
"We are not convinced," he concluded, "that a person, by mere
presence in a suspected car loses immunities from search of his
person to which he would otherwise be entitled."' 6
Turning then to the argument of the government that the
right to arrest for a federal crime was a matter of federal law
and should be determined by a uniform rule, he pointed out
that there was no federal statute which laid down a general rule
for arrest without a warrant for federal offences but that there
was an old federal law which provided that arrests within a state
for federal offenses were to be "agreeable to the usual mode of
process against offenders in such state." The law of New York,
therefore, provided the standard by which the legality of the arrest was to be determined, he said, and under that law an arrest
without a warrant could be made for a misdemeanor, only if com95Id. at 586.
"Id. at 587.
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mitted in an officer's presence and for a felony only if an officer
had reasonable grounds to believe the one arrested had committed
it. Di Re had been indicted for the misdemeanor of possessing
counterfeit gasoline coupons and Justice Jackson pointed out that
the government had conceded that "the only person who committed a possible misdemeanor in the open presence of the officers
was Reed. ' '19

But on appeal the government had argued that

there was probably cause to arrest Di Re for the felony of knowingly possessing counterfeit coupons with intent to utter them as
true, and also for the felony of conspiracy under section 37 of the
Criminal Code. But Justice Jackson pointed out that the only
evidence in the record to justify arrest on either of these grounds
was Di Re's presence in the car on the street of a large city in daylight in view of every passerby, and that this failed "to support the
inference of any felony at all." 8 Nor did Di Re's failure to protest
his arrest create any inference of probable cause for arrest; he had
a right, said the opinion, "to submit to custody and to reserve his
defenses for the neutral tribunals erected by the law for the purpose of judging his case." 9 In closing Justice Jackson pointed out
that the Court had previously said a number of times that a search
could not be made legal by what is found but the search "is good
or bad when it starts and does not change character from its
success."' 00
In Johnson v. United States,10 1 federal narcotic agents on smelling burning opium in a hotel room knocked on the door, identified themselves, and were admitted by the lone woman occupant.
They put her under arrest at once and searched the room finding
incriminating evidence. They did not have a warrant of any
kind and the question before the Court was the legality of the
arrest and of the search. Justice Jackson again wrote the opinion
for the majority reversing the conviction in the lower court. He
began by saying that entrance was "demanded under color of office
and granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.' 0 2 After
saying that odors of burning opium testified to by experts might
0 id. at 592.

18Id. at 593.
'OId. at 594.
10Id. at 595.
102383 U.S. 10 (1948).
Id.at 13.
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justify a magistrate in issuing a search warrant he said that here
"no reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except
the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay." Under
the circumstances of the case he thought these considerations were
not enough "to by-pass the constitutional requirement."' 103 "When
the right to privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search
is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent,"' 10 4 he said. The government
defended the search as incident to the arrest but conceded in effect
that there was no right to arrest until the officers had entered the
room and found petitioner to be the sole occupant. But since the
entry itself was illegal Justice Jackson said the government's position was equivalent to trying to justify the arrest by the search
and the search by the arrest which would not do. 0 5
In Trupiano v. United States'0 6 the Court had an opportunity
again to apply the principle laid down in the Harris Case.
Trupiano, Antoniole and others rented a farm in New Jersey on
which they built a barn and established a still. The owner of the
farm reported the enterprise to the agents of the Alcohol Tax
Unit of the National Government. One of its agents, Nilsen, obtained work on the farm with the men running the still. He reported regularly to his superiors for several weeks. At an appointed time agents descended on the barn and looking through
the open doors, saw the still in operation with Antoniole in attendance. They entered, arrested him, and seized the distilling
equipment together with 262 five-gallon cans of illicit alcohol.
Trupiano was not present but was arrested at a different place.
At his trial he challenged the seizure of the equipment because
the agents had no warrant of any kind. Justice Murphy wrote the
opinion for the majority holding the seizure was illegal because
of the absence of a search warrant.
Although there was a lawful arrest Justice Murphy said it was
"a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable," because of "the desirability of having magistrates rather than police officers determine when searches and
"3Id. at 15.
'0 Id. at 14.
n5Id. at 17.

334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed
upon such activities.' 07 He emphasized that the agents had all
the time and knowledge necessary to get a warrant and that the
equipment was such that it could not easily be moved. He quoted
what the Court said in the Johnson case above that no reason was
"offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay." He stressed the
fact that Antoniole's arrest and proximity to the proeprty was "a
fortuitous circumstance which was inadequate to legalize the
seizure." "We do not believe," he said "that the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment to the facts of this case depends upon such
a fortuitous factor as the precise location of Antoniole at the time
of the raid."'10 He went on to say that to search and seize without
a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest had "always been considered to be a strictly limited right" growing out of the "inherent
necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest" and required
more than "merely a lawful arrest;" otherwise, he said, the exception "swollows the general principle." He commented briefly
on the Harris case and pointed out some factual differences with
the present case especially the fact that in the present, in contrast
to the Harris case, the location and precise nature of the articles
seized were known so that a warrant could easily have been obtained. He cited also the case of Taylor v. United States'00 where
prohibition agents on smelling liquor in a garage and seeing what
was thought to be cases of it in the garage broke in and seized the
liquor only to have their conduct declared illegal because they
had plenty of time to get a search warrant but did not do so.
Effective operation of government he concluded "could hardly be
embarrassed by the requirement that arresting officers who have
three weeks or more within which to secure the authorization of
judicial authority for making a search and seizure should secure
such authority and not be left to their own discretion as to what is
to be searched and what is to be seized.""10
Chief Justice Vinson wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in
by Justices Black, Reed and Burton. After reviewing the facts of
the case and pointing out that the majority agreed that the arrest
1 7 Id. at 705.

'sId. at 708.
"' See second installment (1953), 41 Ky. L. J. 409.
nO 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948).
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of Antoniole was lawful, he said that the rule was well established
that reasonable searches and seizures could be made at the time of
a lawful arrest, quoting again the statement from the Agnello case
which he had used in his majority opinion in the Harriscase. He
pointed out that here the things seized were in plain sight and
said that "to insist upon the use of a search warrant in situations
where the issuance of such a warrant can contribute nothing to
the preservation of the rights which the Fourth Amendment was
intended to protect, serves only to open an avenue of escape for
those guilty of crime and to menace the effective operation of
government which is an essential precondition to the existence of
all civil liberties.""' He considered the Taylor case relied on by
the majority and said that in that case no one was in the garage
and there was no reason to think there was and that the agents
did not lawfully enter to make an arrest. It furnished no support
he thought for the majority's position. He then commented on
Justice Murphy's emphasis on the fact that Antoniole's proximity
to the articles seized was a "fortuitious circumstance which was
inadequate to legalize the seizure" by saying "we suppose that any
arrest of a party engaged in the commission of a felony is based in
part upon an element of chance. Criminals do not normally
choose to engage in felonious enterprises before an audience of
police officials."" r He challenged the use made of the Johnson
case by the majority. There he pointed out the Court held
the arrest was also unlawful, and that of course under such a circumstance a search and seizure would also be unlawful. He closed
by saying "we believe that the result reached today is not consistent
with judicial authority as it existed before the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment nor as it has developed since that time. Nor
do we, that the decision commends itself as adopted to conserve
vital public and individual interests... at best, the operation of
the rule which the court today enunciates for the first time may
be expected to confound confusion in a field already replete with
complexities.""13
It seems obvious that this decision is inconsistent with the principle laid down in the Harriscase although the majority opinion
did not clearly say so. Justice Murphy contented himself by pointn" Id. at 714.
2
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ing out the factual differences between the two cases and said he
would "leave it to another day" to test the Harris principle. In
a sense both cases were out of line with past law. In the Harris
case there was a new and tremendously important extension of
the right without a warrant to search the "place" where a lawful
arrest is made. In the Trupiano case the Court in ruling out the
seizure of material in plain view and being used at the time of
arrest in the commission of the crime went contrary to its own
decision in the Marron case and to the rule generally applied in
English and American courts that officers making a lawful arrest
can seize the instruments of crime being used at the time of arrest.
In McDonaldv. United States"M petitioners were convicted for
running a lottery known as the numbers game in Washington,
D. C. McDonald lived on the second floor of Mrs. Terry's rooming house and had been under observation by police for sometime.
On the afternoon of the arrest the police heard the sound of adding machines, often used in the numbers game. Assuming that
the game was in operation they surrounded the house. One of
them entered through a window to the landlady's apartment and
let the others in. They searched the rooms on first floor and on
the second floor an officer stood on a chair in the hall and looked
through the open transom into McDonald's room. He saw petitioners at a table with adding machines, numbers slips, and
money piled on the table. He told McDonald to open the door
which he did. The officers arrested both petitioners and seized the
equipment being used. McDonald challenged the legality of the
seizure of the equipment and its use as evidence.
justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion holding the search
and seizure illegal. The government justified the search as incident to a lawful arrest. Justice Douglas took the same position
that was taken by the Court in the Trupiano case that "a search
without a warrant demands exceptional circumstances." There
were no such circumstances here he thought. Since the police had
been watching these men for months there was no reason except
inconvenience and delay for not getting a warrant. The suspects
were not trying to escape, nor destroy the property seized, and an
officer could have been left on guard while others got a search
warrant. He repeated again that the Fourth Amendment "inter"'335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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posed a magistrate between the citizen and the police." This was
done he said "not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe
haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce
the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and
15
the arrest of criminals.'
Justice Burton, with Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Reed
concurring, wrote a dissent. He took the position that this was a
clear case of lawful arrest for an offense committed in the presence
of the officers and "the seizure of the instruments of the crime
which then were in plain sight. There was no search. There is,
therefore, no issue as to the need for a search warrant." He went
on to explain that the petitioners being tenants "had no right to
object to the presence of officers in the hall of the rooming house,"
and the observance by the officers of the commission of the crime
"justified the immediate arrest of those engaged in it without
securing a warrant for such arrest." 6
The difference between the majority and minority opinion in
this and in the preceding case is chiefly a difference as to the importance of requiring officers to secure a search warrant when it is
reasonably possible to do so instead of proceeding on their own discretion. Justice Burton would seem to be on sound ground in his
position that the petitioners could not object to the presence of the
police in the hall. Mrs. Terry no doubt could have made legal objection but did not do so, and under the law, as has already been
shown, the instruments of crime in plain sight when a lawful arrest is made may be seized without a warrant. Here the arrest
would seem to be lawful since the petitioners were caught in the
act. Justice Douglas for the majority refused to examine the logic
used by the government and the minority of the Court because he
said, "We reject the result." As a result of this and the preceding
case it would seem that the majority of the Court had embraced
the rule that a search warrant where it was practicable to get one
was a requirement for a search for and seizure of evidence whether
or not there was a lawful arrest, at least where officers had plenty
of opportunity to get one.
Id. at 456.
- Id. at 462.
'

